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Abstract. In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with con¯icting
interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy
concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the pro-
ject, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a
minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However,
since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the min-
ister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the
agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the
advisors have di¨erent preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they
have the same preferences).
1 Introduction
The positive analysis of government behaviour seeks to understand why poli-
cymakers implement particular policies. Since the nature of policy decisions is
at least partly determined by information about policy e¨ects, the analysis of
political decision making requires a theory of the choice of view about the
e½cacy of policies.
Several studies have investigated the role of information about policy
e¨ects recently. In particular Roemer (1994), Swank (1994), Schultz (1997),
Letterie and Swank (1997) and Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) analyse the
interplay between politicians and voters in an environment where politicians
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Research for ®nancial support.are better informed about the consequences of policies than the electorate. In
a democracy where the preferences of competing policymakers are polarised
(cf. Alesina 1987) politicians will have incentive to exploit their informational
advantage. Schultz (1996) argues that for a stylized two-party system ine½-
ciencies arise, because the incumbent political party has an incentive to high-
light the merits and to disguise the drawbacks of a policy in order to convince
voters of the desirability of her decision. The bottomline is that polarisation is
harmful because the struggle for political in¯uence precludes policies adjusting
to the true costs.
An important aspect of the studies cited above is that these only focus on
the relationship between political parties and voters. However, because policy-
makers lack information about the consequences of policy themselves as well,
a leading role is played by advisors. Cukierman and Tomassi (1998, p. 181)
note that ``Incumbent politicians normally have better information than the
general public about the likely outcomes of alternative policies. Governments
deal with public policy issues on a daily basis, they have access to the advice
of specialists, and in some cases they possess classi®ed information.'' In this
paper we argue that information asymmetries regarding the mapping of policy
instruments into outcomes provides certain political actors a means to a¨ect
the equilibrium outcomes of a political process. In particular, those actors will
employ their discretion to send messages or to appoint advisors as a means to
in¯uence the policy outcome in a favourable way.
Of course, there are other possibilities to in¯uence policy outcomes. For
instance, Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that government policy may
depend on the pressure exerted by lobby groups rewarding particular decisions
taken by an incumbent policymaker. These groups may induce the policy-
maker to behave in the interest of the lobby by o¨ering contributions to the
o½ceholder. In this environment it is obvious that outcomes re¯ect the pref-
erences of the lobby, although the initial preferences of the lobby group and
the o½ceholder may di¨er substantially.
Often politicians have the ability to appoint advisors, who may serve two
roles. First, policymakers may consult advisors to acquire information about
the consequences of an innovation. This is what we would like to refer to as the
information motive of advice. Secondly, advisors may be consulted to enhance
political support for a decision. This is called the persuasion motive of advice.
If a policymaker is risk averse he can reduce his uncertainty by acquiring
information. Hence, consulting an advisor may reduce the probability of
making a ``wrong'' decision. Crawford and Sobel (1982), Calvert (1985) and
Lupia and McCubbins (1994b) have shown that predispositional similarity
plays an important role when acquiring advice. If the preferences of a sender
and a receiver of a message are aligned a sender has little incentive to use
information strategically, and the likelihood that the information provider
truthfully reveals his knowledge is large. Nevertheless, a receiver's ability to
learn from an expert may improve for the following four reasons. First,
learning improves as penalties for lying increase (Lupia and McCubbins
1994a,b). Secondly, learning is enhanced if higher costs are associated with
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the possibility to verify information by the receiver of a message or by con-
sulting a third party improves learning (Lupia and McCubbins 1994b).
Fourthly, if the sender may prove he is knowledgable (Austen-Smith 1994)
possibilities to learn increase. These features may be used to design institu-
tions that substitute for shared predispositions to enhance learning.
Hence, various arguments exist why policymakers may attend to sources
that have a di¨erent predisposition. In this paper we o¨er an additional ex-
planation why predispositional similarity may be abandoned as a selection
criterion for choosing advisors. In particular we show under what conditions
political actors choose advisors whose preferences are at odds with their own
and we show why this is so. We use the fact that a policymaker may use
advice to support political legitimacy of her decision, which is the second role
an advisor may serve. Letterie and Swank (1997) consider a model in which
advice may be used to acquire information to avoid ``wrong'' decisions and to
convince voters of the desirability of her policy decision. Their analysis pre-
sumes that the advisor has private information about the e¨ects of a policy
proposal which are uncertain to the other players of the game, because the
mapping of policy instruments to outcomes is a¨ected by one stochastic vari-
able. The advisor is appointed by the policymaker. Upon observing the mes-
sage of the advisor concerning the desirability of the public policy the median
voter in parliament decides whether or not the policy decision is approved.
Letterie and Swank (1997) show that in principle the policymaker has an
incentive to appoint an advisor whose preferences are closely aligned to his
own preferences. However, under certain conditions the policymaker will
abandon predispositional similarity in order to be able to convince the median
voter in parliament about the merits of a policy decision.
The present paper extends the model of Letterie and Swank (1997) in the
following directions. First, in the model the outcome of a policy is uncertain
due to the presence of two stochastic variables. This re¯ects the notion that
the consequences of many policy decisions are uncertain in several respects.
For instance, there is often a considerable amount of uncertainty about how
large public construction projects like dikes or harbours will a¨ect surround-
ing ecological systems. Furthermore, due to engineering uncertainties it is
often hard to predict the cost of the construction bearing on the government
budget. Secondly, we will set-up an economic model of policy advice in which
®ve players determine the outcome of a policy debate: a spending minister
who initiates a project; a ®nance minister whose approval is sought if the
spending minister gets the go-sign from his advisor, and once the project has
passed the ®nance minister the project still has to be approved by parliament.
Both the ministers are assisted by appointed policy advisors who are experts
on a particular aspect of the project. Parliament has no policy advisor. It has
to make a decision based on the information provided by the specialised
advisors of the spending and ®nance minister.
The model is analysed using game theoretical insights. Our results are
related to those obtained in cheap talk games as developed by Crawford and
Policy advisors 441Sobel (1982) and Letterie and Swank (1997). Using this model we are able to
shed some light on the role of advisors. In particular, the fact that our model
revolves around the selection of two advisors allows us to analyse when the
preferences of these advisors are the same or when they are di¨erent. Often, if
policy advisors produce contradictory research reports they are dismissed as a
quarrelsome lot (see van Dalen et al. 1998). However, the characterisation of
advisors as the instigators of a polarised policy debate is not entirely correct,
as we will show. The appearance of states of dissension and consensus in
political debates are common phenomena and it is our aim to discover when
policy advisors tend to agree or disagree with each other. We show that
polarisation of advice is not necessarily the rule, even though the policy-
makers in charge may have divergent biases. There are, however, forces at
work which make dissension among avisors a likely outcome; forces such as
the circumstance that the spending minister is highly in favour of spending
while at the same time the median voter in parliament is not in favour of
spending. This implies that the preferences of the ministers are crucial to un-
derstand whether a state of dissension or consensus in policy debates appears.
Finally, we show that once a democracy is trapped in an equilibrium of
polarisation, the degree of polarisation increases if the preferences of the
spending and ®nance department become more polarized and if the uncer-
tainty surrounding the project or proposal increases.
The contents of this paper are the following. First, we will set up an eco-
nomic model of policy advice (Sect. 2). The model is analysed in Sect. 3 and
subsequently discussed in some detail in Sects. 4 and 5. Section 6 winds up
with a discussion of our model of policy advice.
2 A model of policy advice
The model revolves around a certain project, X. As to this project there are
two alternatives: the project is undertaken (X  1) or the status quo is main-
tained (X  0). If the project is undertaken an arbitrary individual, denoted I,
receives a pay-o¨ equal to:
PIX  1je;mi  e  m 1
where i measures the extent to which player I is biased towards undertaking
the project. The consequences of the project are surrounded with uncertainty.
This is formalised by introducing the stochastic terms e and m which are uni-
formly and independently distributed over the interval ÿt;t. Considering
prevailing information on e and m some players in our model may prefer the
status quo to the implementation of the project. If the project is not under-
taken, the status quo prevails in which case for any player I the pay-o¨ equals
zero PIX  00. Hence, an individual I attributes highest utility to the
status quo if EPIX  1je;m < 0.
The presence of these two stochastic variables re¯ects the notion that the
consequences of many policy decisions are uncertain in several respects. The
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tate our analysis. Of course, this is an approximation of reality. However,
there are many examples in which the independence assumption is likely to
hold. Consider for instance the construction of large public projects like dikes
or harbours. Often there is a considerable amount of uncertainty about how
such projects will a¨ect surrounding ecological systems. Furthermore, due to
engineering uncertainties it is often hard to predict the cost of the construction.
Due to various sources of uncertainty, advice concerning these matters
does not come available at one point in time, but arrives sequentially as the
agenda setter ± in most cases a spending minister supported by his research
sta¨ ± proposes a national project which has to compete with other interests
inside government. In most cases the minister of ®nance performs the role of
the nation's ®nancial watchdog, and he also consults his advisors. Finally,
congress or parliament has to approve of the project, if it ever reaches that
destination. In the evaluation of the project members of parliament have to
rely on the information provided by the two advisors of the ministers in the
preparatory stage.
To analyse advisor selection in this political setting we consider a model in
which ®ve players are involved in making a decision about the project. There
are two ministers, the median voter in parliament and two advisors. The ®rst
player, labelled S, is the minister of a spending department. The clientele of
player S receives relatively high bene®ts from the project. If the project is un-
dertaken, the pay-o¨ of player S is given by PSX  1je;ms  e  m, where
s measures the department's bias towards the project. Without further infor-
mation about e and m the spending minister expects to bene®t from under-
taking the project: EPSX  1je;m > 0. This implies s > 0.
The second player, F, is the ®nance minister. The ®nance minister is
assumed to be primarily interested in ®scal discipline, and is therefore less
biased towards undertaking the project than the spending minister. Hence, if
the project is undertaken, player F's pay-o¨ is given by PFX  1je;m
f  e  m, where f < s.
Undertaking the project requires approval by parliament. The third player
in the game is the median voter in parliament, and, for brevity, is called the
median voter, V. The median voter is bound neither by the particular interests
of the spending department nor by the particular interests of the ®nance
department. For this reason, V's predisposition towards the project, n,i s
assumed to lie between f and s. Hence, PVX  1je;mn  e  m, where
f < n < s.
Both the spending minister and the ®nance minister have the authority
over a research sta¨. The research sta¨ of the ®nance minister, player BF,i s
specialised in assessing the costs of projects. Player BF has private information
about the realisation of m. The last player in the model, BS, is the research sta¨
of the spending minister, which has private information about the realisation
of e. Like the other players in the model, members of the research sta¨s are
characterised by their predispositions towards the project. The pay-o¨ of a
bureaucrat B, where B A fBS;BFg is given by: PBX  1je;mb  e  m,
Policy advisors 443where b A fbS;bFg. Each minister appoints the researchers working for him. It
is assumed that there exists a continuum of applicants for the research jobs in
terms of their predispositions towards the project. Hence, the parameters bS
and bF are choice variables for players S and F, respectively.
An individual I in our model receives a pay-o¨ equal to i  e  m if the
project is undertaken. In principle there is no a priori reason why the di¨erent
players would weight the random shocks e and m equally. For instance, it is
likely that the spending minister is not as interested in the consequences of the
project for the government budget as the ®nance minister. Hence, S may
weight m by Q A 0;1. Similarly, F may weight e. We conjecture that our
results remain by considering this extension. We abstract from weighting
shocks for tractability reasons. The same argument applies for considering
risk aversion. We assume that all individuals are risk neutral. A drawback of
this assumption is that risk neutrality for all agents removes some of the eco-
nomic rationale for getting advice. However, in this paper we primarily study
how advice may be used to persuade other players in the policy process.
Therefore, we abstract from risk aversion, because it would complicate the
analysis tremendously. The case of acquiring advice to reduce uncertainty has
been studied by Calvert (1985) for instance. He argues that reducing uncer-
tainty requires attending to sources that share the decision maker's own pre-
dispositions (see also Crawford and Sobel 1982). This argument applies in
particular if political institutions are lacking that may serve as a substitute
for shared predispositions to enhance a sender's credibility (cf. Lupia and
McCubbins 1994a,b). In this paper we assume that such institutions are
absent. For instance, in our model an advisor does not face a penalty for lying
and the probability of detection is zero. Furthermore, the advisor does not
incur any cost associated with taking action.
Now that we have described the players in the game and their pay-o¨s, let
us discuss the order of actions in the game. In the ®rst stage of the game,
nature chooses e and m. In stage two, the spending minister, labelled S,
appoints the members of his research sta¨: bS A ÿy;y. In the third stage,
the realisation of e is revealed to the research sta¨ of the spending department.
Next, the research sta¨ sends a message, mS, about the desirability of the
project. Two messages can be sent: the project should be undertaken, YS,o r
the project should not be undertaken, NS. More formally, mS A fYS;NSg. This
assumption implies that we consider the bureaucrats' message to be non-
veri®able.1 Since the choice of whether or not to implement the project is
1 In our model the advisor is assumed to be informed about a stochastic variable. We
do not focus on the credibility of the advisor. Such an extension can however be found
in Austen-Smith (1994) who develops a model in which the advisor (sender) decides
whether or not to acquire information. Without any further information this decision is
unobserved by the receiver of the message, hence a ver®ability problem exists. Austen-
Smith allows for a more complicated message space. An informed sender may provide
both information about the realisation of a stochastic variable (like in our model), and
the sender may credibly provide some information that he or she is informed. We dis-
regard this extension of the model for tractability reasons. Furthermore, we disregard
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If mS  YS, the spending minister puts forward a proposal to undertake
the project. In contrast, if mS  NS, the game ends. In the fourth stage of the
game, the minister of ®nance appoints the members of his research sta¨:
bF A ÿy;y. Next, in stage ®ve the realisation of m is revealed to the
research sta¨ of the ®nance minister. Player BF sends a message about the
desirability of the project, taking into account the information revealed about
e by BS. Analogous to BS,B F can send two messages: mF A fYF;NFg. Finally,
in the last stage of the game the median voter accepts or rejects the proposal
put forward by the spending minister.
In the game described above we have made a number of additional re-
strictive assumptions. First of all, we have assumed that if the research sta¨ of
the spending department sends a message not to undertake the project, the
spending minister decides not to undertake the project and hence the game
ends. This assumption reduces the number of cases to be examined consider-
ably. A drawback of this assumption is that communication between the re-
search sta¨ of the spending department and the other players in the model is
not a result, but more or less imposed. However, as we will see in Sect. 3 for
all interesting cases communication between the research sta¨ of the ®nance
minister and the median voter, where nothing is imposed, is the most likely
case.
One way of looking at the assumption is that a minister, who puts forward
a proposal to undertake the project against the recommendation of his re-
search sta¨, runs the risk of political isolation if the project is rejected. Such a
minister will be characterised as a Don Quixote-type, rather than as somebody
who takes the interests of his clientele serious.2 Alternatively, one may imag-
ine that research sta¨s of various spending departments compete for setting
projects on the political agenda. All projects which are not supported by their
research sta¨s loose to projects which are supported.3
A second assumption is that the spending minister does not appoint indi-
viduals to do research on m. Likewise the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister
does not do research on e. This assumption has some appeal in that research
the possibility that the median voter in parliament and the ministers are able to acquire
a direct observation of the stochastic variable themselves or by consulting an exoge-
nous third party who can disclose information regarding the random shocks. To put it
di¨erently, they are not able to verify the realisation of these variables (see also Lupia
and McCubbins 1994b).
2 We can incorporate this into our game formally by assuming that the pay-o¨ of
player S is far below zero if mS  NS and his proposal to undertake the project is
rejected by parliament. Then player S will never put forward a proposal against the
recommendation of his research sta¨.
3 If the research sta¨ of the spending minister serves as the agenda setter, a more
plausible order of action is that ®rst player S determines bS, next nature reveals e to
player bS, and then player bS sends a message. The resulting model yields the same
results as the game discussed in the main text.
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is that it avoids duplication of research. This argument is especially strong if
the costs of research on a speci®c ®eld decline with the scale of research, but
the costs of research increase when the ®eld of research becomes broader. In
this paper, we do not explain why research sta¨s are specialised. Nevertheless,
it is likely that this assumption does a¨ect our results. In line with this, for
instance, Lupia and McCubbins (1994b) ®nd that if there is a possibility to
verify information by consulting another expert and if there are substantial
(reputational) penalties for lying, incentives to mislead reduce and learning
may improve.
Thirdly, we assume that only the spending and ®nance minister can ap-
point advisors. In our model parliament does not have the opportunity to
employ an external advisor to check the validity of advise provided by the
bureaucrats. The results of our analysis are likely to depend on this assump-
tion, even if such appointments are made only occasionally.4
Fourthly, the assumed order of play is somewhat arbitrary and perhaps
even implausible. However, without changing the outcome of the game, vari-
ous stages can be alternated. The only thing that matters is that the median
voter acts in the last stage of the game, and that player BS acts before player
BF. We have chosen the order of actions described above mainly to facilitate
the discussion about the equilibria of the game. However, the order of play
does introduce an asymmetry which can be crucial for the resulting equilib-
rium. In particular, player BF can take account of information on e as
revealed by BS, whereas BS is not able by de®nition to incorporate informa-
tion on m.B S does, however, know that the ®nance minister uses advisors
strategically.
To make the game interesting we have to make some additional assump-
tions about the players' predispositions and the intervals e and m must lie
within. Evidently, if t is very small relative to the di¨erences between the pre-
disposition of the spending ministers and the median voter, the messages of
the research sta¨s cannot a¨ect the decision about the project. Throughout
this paper we assume that s > 0, f < n < s < t, and that f  t > 0. These
restrictions assure that communication between the median voter and one of
the research sta¨s may a¨ect the median voter's decision about the project.
Table 1 summarises the game:




(1) Nature chooses e and m; both e and m are uniformly distributed on ÿt;t
4 See also footnote 1.
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(3) BS observes e and sends message mS A fYS;NSg;i fmS  NS the game ends and
X  0; if mS  YS, then S puts forward a proposal to undertake the project
(4) F chooses bF A ÿy;y by appointing BF
(5) BF observes m and sends message mF A fYF;NFg
(6) V chooses X A f1;0g
Pay-o¨s
. PIX  1je;mi  e  m where I f S;F;BS;BF;Vg and i f s; f;bS;bF;ng
with s > 0, f < n < s < t and f  t > 0 . PIX  00
3 Equilibria
Necessary conditions for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game are (1)
the players' actions must be optimal responses to each other, and (2) the
players' beliefs about e and m must follow Bayes' rule. In order to facilitate the
discussion of the formal analysis we split the game into two parts. The ®rst
part consists of the actions of the spending minister and his research sta¨
in stages 2±3. The second part comprises the players' actions in stages 4±6.
Because we should solve the game by backward induction to ensure time
consistency, we start the analysis with a discussion about the second part.
3.1 The median voter, the ®nance minister, and his research sta¨
In stages 4±6 the following events can develop: the median voter accepts or
rejects the proposal, the research sta¨ of the ®nance department sends a mes-
sage about the desirability of the project, and the ®nance minister selects his
researchers. Because the game ends in stage 3 if in stage 2 the research sta¨ of
S has sent mS  NS, we suppose that mS  YS. Players' beliefs about e, given
mS  YS, are denoted by EejmS  YS, where E: denotes the expectations
operator.
First, consider the action of the research sta¨ of the ®nance department.
Player BF wants the median voter to accept the proposal if and only if he
expects the project to yield higher expected utility than the status quo:5
bF  EejmS  YSm > 0 2
In this case the advisor should recommend the project by sending YF in order
to persuade the median voter to vote in favour of the project. Otherwise, BF
should send NF.
Next, consider the median voter's optimal response to player BF's strategy.
Player BF's action a¨ects the beliefs about m. Using (2) and the stochastic
properties of m, Bayes' rule implies that the beliefs concerning m are updated as
5 Without loss of generality it is assumed that if the median voter is indi¨erent










t  bF  EejmS  YS
3
Using (3) we obtain the median voter's expected pay-o¨, conditional on the
messages of the research sta¨s:















Now consider the selection of bF by the ®nance minister. The ®nance minister
wants the project to be undertaken if and only if the expected pay-o¨ of
undertaking the project exceeds that of the status quo:
f  EejmS  YSEmjmF > 0 5
The ®nance minister cannot directly a¨ect the median voter's decision about
the project. However, because the message of his research sta¨ may induce the
®nal decision about the project, the ®nance minister may indirectly in¯uence
the ®nal decision through its choice of bF. Of course, this requires that com-
munication occurs between the median voter and the research sta¨. It is evi-
dent that the median voter always rejects the proposal if a recommendation of
the project by the advisor of the ®nance minister yields a negative expected
utility: EPVjmF  YF < 0. Similarly, the median voter always accepts the
proposal, regardless the message sent by BF,i fEPVjmF  NF > 0. Obvi-
ously, the ®nance minister is only interested in appointing a research sta¨
which can communicate with the median voter. Hence, the interesting case
occurs if EpVjmF  YF > 0 and EpVjmF  NFU0. In this case, the
median voter accepts the proposal if mF  YF and rejects the proposal if
mF  NF. This imposes the following restrictions on the choice of bF (see (4)):
2n  EejmS  YSÿtUbF < 2n  EejmS  YSt 6
If (6) is violated, the median voter ignores the message sent by BF,s ot h a t
BF does not a¨ect the ®nance minister's expected pay-o¨.6 However, if (6)
holds, the median voter favours the status quo if the research sta¨ advises
not to undertake the project. Then the median voter votes against the project
if he observes message NF, in which case utility is equal to zero. Hence,
ProbmF  NFEPFjmF  NF0. Using this we obtain the ®nance minis-
6 The upperbound of (6) is never violated in equilibrium. In particular in Appendix E
we argue that player F always chooses bF such that EpVjmF  YFV0. Furthermore,
the lowerbound is also satis®ed due to equation (8). Hence, communication is always
possible between BF and V.
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EPFProbmF  YFEpFjmF  YF
1
2t










Maximising (7) with respect to bF, subject to (6) yields
1 bF  f if 2n  EejmS  YSÿtU f;
2 bF  2n  EejmS  YSÿt otherwise 8
The ®rst part of Eq. (8) shows that in principle, the ®nance minister wants to
appoint researchers whose predispositions coincide with that of himself. This
happens if BF's information convinces the median voter that the ®nance min-
ister's wishes regarding the project are in line with the voter's. Since parlia-
ment decides about the implementation of the project, the ®nance minister
must assure that communication takes place between BF and V. This requires
that bF is close to n (the restriction in 6). If the restriction is violated, the
®nance minister is forced to appoint a sta¨ of researchers whose predisposi-
tion toward the project is closer to that of the median voter. Since by assump-
tion f < n < s, this implies that the ®nance minister must select bF > f. The
second part of Eq. (8) gives the lowest value of bF for which communication
between the median voter and the research sta¨ occurs.
It follows from the above discussion that if the messages of both advisors
are favourable (i.e. mS  YS and mF  YF) then the median voter chooses to
support the project (X  1). In contrast, if BS sends mS  YS and BF sends
mF  NF then the median voter will not support the project (X  0).
So far we have only considered a partially pooling equilibrium for this part
of the game. However, the message sent by BF does not directly a¨ect the
other players' pay-o¨. Therefore, this part of the model belongs to the class of
``cheap-talk'' games (Crawford and Sobel 1982). In this type of games also a
pooling equilibrium exists, in which the receivers of a message ignore it and
where the message mF A YF;NF is independent of the actual value of m. For
instance, BF always sends the message mF  YF. Then the posterior beliefs are
equal to the prior beliefs and if prior beliefs are not updated in response to
messages then EmEmjmF remains equal to zero. Obviously the posited
strategies are optimal responses to each other, raising the question whether a
pooling equilibrium or partially pooling equilibrium as discussed before is
most likely to occur. However, the pooling equilibrium is unstable, whereas
the partially pooling equilibrium is not. If there is a small probability that V
does not ignore the message sent by BF, player BF has an incentive to send
messages that communicate information to V. In particular, if (2) holds, BF
has an incentive to send mF  YF; otherwise BF will send mF  NF.7 How-
7 Note that BF will also adhere to this strategy if there is a small probability that V
does not listen to BF.
Policy advisors 449ever, then V will follow the advice sent by BF. In short, since a partially
pooling equilibrium exists, a pooling equilibrium is unlikely to occur.
3.2 The spending minister and his research sta¨
In stages 2±3 of the game, the spending minister chooses bS, and the research
sta¨ of the spending minister sends a message about the desirability of the
project. Both players anticipate upon the strategies of the players acting in
stages 4±6.
First consider the action of the research sta¨ of the spending minister. By
assumption, the game ends if mS  NS, implying that if player BS expects to
bene®t from the project, he should send mS  YS. In order to calculate player
BS' expected utility it is convenient to condition on the message sent by BF.
BS anticipates that for unfavourable values of m, player BF sends NF. This
induces parliament to reject the proposal to undertake the project, implying
that the status quo remains. Therefore, ProbmF  NFEPSjmF  NF0.
We obtain:
EPBSProbmF  YFbS  e  EmjmF  YF 9
where EmjmF  YF is given by (3). Eq. (9) shows that even though the
research sta¨ of the spending minister has no information about m, its action
is based on the conditional expected value of m.
According to Eq. (9) BS should send message YS if and only if:
e > ÿbS ÿ EmjmF  YF 10
After substitution of (3) into (10) the stochastic properties of e and Bayes' rule








2t  2bS ÿ bF
11
Let us now consider the response of player S to the other players' strategies.
We have to consider two cases: (1) the case where bF  f, and (2) the case
where bF  2n  EejmS  YSÿt (see also Eq. (8)).8
3.2.1 Case 1: The ®nance minister chooses bF  f
The strategies of the players acting after player S imply that the project is only
undertaken if both research sta¨s advise that the project should be under-
taken. Hence, when choosing bS, the expected pay-o¨ of player S is given by:
EPSProbmS  YSProbmF  YF
 s  EejmS  YSEmjmF  YF 12
8 The expressions for EmjmF  YF and EmjmF  NF in Table 2 can be found by
substituting (11) into (3).








2t  2f ÿ bS
13
EmjmF  YF and EejmS  YS are given by Eqs. (3) and (10) respectively.
It follows from (13) that higher values of bS increase the probability that
mS  YS, but decrease the probability that mF  YF. The intuition behind this
is straightfoward. It is unlikely that a research sta¨, which is strongly biased
towards undertaking the project, advises not to undertake the project. As a
consequence, if such a research sta¨ recommends the project, little informa-
tion is revealed about e, so that mS  YS tends to have smaller e¨ects on the
attitude of the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister towards the project as bS
increases. Then, in the eyes of BF, advisor BS becomes less credible. Di¨er-
entiating (12) with respect to bs yields the following ®rst order condition:9
2b2
S ÿ 22t  2s  fbS  2st ÿ f
2  2tf  5sf  0
with bS A max
1
2





f  t;2f  t
 
14
Solving for bS gives after some tedious but straightforward algebra the fol-
lowing expression:
b

















In Sect. 4 of this paper we discuss the properties of b
S. However, it is worth-
while to note here that b
S depends not only on the bias of its own minister, s,
but also on that of the ®nance minister, f, while b
S is not related to the pref-
erence parameter of the median voter, n. This may seem surprising, since the
median voter in parliament ultimately decides whether the project is under-
taken or not, and accordingly has to be convinced about the merits of the
project. However, we know that if case 1 applies where bF  f, the message of
the ®nance minister's research sta¨ convinces the median voter. Hence, the
advisor of the ®nance minister needs to be persuaded about the desirability of
the project. Therefore, the spending minister primarily considers the con-
sequences of selecting bS on BF's perception regarding the desirability of the
9 Eq. (12) is a third degree polynomial function of bs, having a local maximum and
a local minimum. Clearly, the probabilities of the advice of the two research sta¨s
to undertake the project should be non-negative and smaller than one. In Appendix
A we show this is the case because bs satis®es bs A max1
2 f ÿ t;2f ÿ t,
min1
2t  f;2t  f. It is straightforward to show that the maximum in this interval
is the optimal value of bs : b
s .
Policy advisors 451project, which explains why the parameter f appears in (15) and the parameter
n does not.
3.2.2 Case 2: The ®nance minister chooses bF  2n  EejmS  YSÿt
Now player S0 expected utility is given by
EPSProbmS  YS ProbmF  YF











Di¨erentiating (16) with respect to bS, after substitution of bF  2n 









It follows straightforwardly that then bF  bS  b
c. Hence, F and S choose
advisors that have the same predisposition towards the project.10 Note that
now, in contrast to case 1, the preference parameter of the median voter, n,
plays an important role in designing optimal research sta¨s. This is due to the
fact that the ®nance minister has to appoint a research sta¨ that can convince
the median voter by choosing bF  2n  EejmS  YSÿt, which introduces
the parameter n into the optimisation problem of the spending minister. In
turn, n appears in the optimal value of bS.11
4 Polarisation or consensus?
In the previous section we have shown that the spending minister either
chooses bS  b
S or bS  b
c. In appendix B we derive Proposition 1, which
provides insight into the question which of these two possibilities is selected
by S.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold C A f; 1
2f  b
S such that if b
c < C
then polarisation occurs where the ministers choose a di¨erent type of advisors
(bS  b
S and bF  f), otherwise, consensus holds where they choose the same
type of advisor (bS  bF  b
c).
10 Note that if bS  bF  b
c then ProbmS  YSProbmF  YF t  n=2t.
These probabilities satisfy standard properties since n  t > f  t > 0 and because
n < t by assumption.
11 We disregard the possible existence of a pooling equilibrium in stage 1 of the model
by arguing that a pooling equilibrium is unstable (see also Section 3.1).
452 W. Letterie et al.Since the threshold C plays an important role in the determination of the type
of advisors appointed by the ministers in equilibrium it is worth considering
how C varies with the parameter s. In Appendix B, we also derive the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. The value of C increases with s.
Using Propositions 1 and 2 and that b
c  11
2n ÿ 1
2t the following proposition
can be obtained straightforwardly which shows that the relative positions of
the players' preferences are crucial to understand whether polarised or con-
sensual policy advice occurs.
Proposition 3. Given that f < n < s < t, if s is high, and if n is low, polarisation
of policy advice occurs; otherwise consensus holds.
Proposition 3 reveals that if the predispositions of the ®nance minister and of
the median voter are very similar, di¨erent advisors are selected. This is
intuitively very appealing. We argued before that communication between BF
and V is a prerequisite. If f and n are close, the ®nance minister can appoint
his ideal advisor with bF  f, who is able to transmit relevant information
about the project X to the voter and who assures perfect alignment of prefer-
ences with the ®nance minister. In that case polarisation of policy advice
occurs. In contrast, if V and S are both highly in favour of the project (n and s
are high), whereas f is relatively low, the ®nance minister needs to ensure
communication between BF and V by choosing bF  b
c. As a consequence
both ministers choose similar advisors.
Furthermore, if the spending minister is very predisposed in favour of
executing the project X, relative to the preferences of F and V the ministers
choose di¨erent advisors. If the project is very appealing to S a priori, it is
more di½cult for S than for F to convince V of the merits of implementing X
and polarisation of policy advice occurs.
Table 2 summarises the beliefs about e and m and the strategies of the
players in a partially pooling equilibrium. Note that the nature of the resulting
outcome in equilibrium depends on the underlying parameters of the model.
Several features of the equilibrium presented in Table 2 are worth consid-
ering. First, note that the project will be approved by the median voter
(X  1) only if both advisors recommend that the project should be under-
taken (i.e. mS  YS and mF  YF). Secondly, the posterior beliefs depend on
the messages send by the advisors. This means that their messages communi-
cate information to the ®ve players in the game. Finally, in some instances F is
able to appoint an advisor whose predispostion coincides with F's. This hap-
pens if information provided by BF induces the median voter to take decisions
that are in accordance with the ®nance minister's preferences. Perfect align-
ment of predispositions is attractive for F.
Resuming, the game analysed in this paper has one unique stable perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Depending on the parameters of the model, in particu-
lar those re¯ecting the preferences of the various players, the ministers either
choose di¨erent types of policy advisors (i.e. polarisation) or choose the same
Policy advisors 453type of policy advisor (i.e. consensus). Uniqueness of the equilibrium is due to
the fact that if a partially pooling equilibrium exists in which the advisor can
communicate useful information about the desirability of the project, a pool-
ing equilibrium is unstable, as we argued before in Sect. 3.1.
5 The extent of polarisation: Comparative static results
Against the background of the objectives of the paper, it is useful to examine
the properties of b
S. We ®rst consider the value of b
s relative to f and s. The
proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 4. If bF  f, then f < b
S < s < t
This proposition states that if the ®nance minister appoints researchers whose
predispositions coincide with that of himself, the spending minister will con-

















2t  2bF ÿ bS
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Player V X  1i f mS  YS ^ mF  YF
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> > > :
Player S if mS  YS; propose the project; otherwise end the game
if b
c UC then bS  b
S otherwise bS  b
C

Player F if b
c UC then bF  f
otherwise bF  b
c

454 W. Letterie et al.sult researchers, who are more biased towards the project than the ®nance
minister, but less biased as the spending minister himself. To provide an intu-
ition for this result recall that we assume here that the research sta¨ of the
®nance minister is able to persuade the median voter of parliament and hence,
chooses bF  f. Consider now the problem the spending minister faces. Basi-
cally, there are two reasons why a spending minister wants to consult experts.
First, the spending minister wants to avoid undertaking the project if the
project does not bene®t him. If this were the only reason for consulting experts,
the spending minister would appoint researchers, whose predispositions coin-
cide with that of himself.
Secondly, the spending minister consults experts to persuade other political
agents to support a proposal to undertake the project. Since in the present
case the message of the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister is decisive, this is
the player who must be persuaded. If the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister
inferred all information about the project from the message of the research
sta¨ of the spending minister, the spending minister would appoint researchers
whose advise exactly would persuade the research sta¨ to support the pro-
posal. However, the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister possesses private
information about the consequences of the project. Due to this, the research
sta¨ of the spending minister is uncertain about the e¨ect of a recommenda-
tion to undertake the project on the action of the research sta¨ of the ®nance
minister. This makes that when appointing researchers, the spending minister
faces a trade-o¨ between acquiring information about the consequences of the
project and using experts to persuade other players to support a proposal to
undertake the project. To acquire information, the spending minister wants
to appoint a researcher whose predisposition is equal to that of himself, but to
convince the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister, he can raise credibility of
the message of his research sta¨, by appointing researchers whose predis-
positions are close to that of those of the researchers of the ®nance minister.
Due to this, the spending minister will appoint researchers who are more
biased towards the project than the researchers of the ®nance minister.
Let us now consider the e¨ects of s, f and t on b
s . The proof of the fol-
lowing proposition is extended to Appendix D.
Proposition 5. If bF  f, then b
S increases with s, f and t.
The comparative static results indicated in Proposition 5 show again that the
spending minister faces a trade-o¨. First, an increase in s induces the spending
minister to select an advisor with a higher predisposition towards the project,
in order to induce decisions he favours. Secondly, a rise in f reduces the con-
¯ict of interest between the ®nance and the spending minister. Hence, the
bene®ts of providing information to the ®nance minister decrease, implying
that the spending minister is inclined to increase bS. Thirdly, a higher t implies
that uncertainty increases as to the e¨ects of the advisor's message to under-
take the project on the research sta¨ of the ®nance minister. Hence, the
spending minister becomes more uncertain about whether communication
arises between the two distinct research sta¨s. Accordingly, the bene®ts to
Policy advisors 455persuade the researchers of the ®nance minister decrease and as a result the
spending minister has an incentive to choose a higher bS.
6 Discussion
Advisors may serve several purposes. In the ®rst place advisors are consulted
to acquire information about the merits of a certain decision, in order to pre-
vent mistakes. Secondly, recommendations provided by advisors may be used
to obtain political support or to advance legitimacy of decisions. These two
aspects of advice are incorporated in the model analysed in this paper. The
analysis revolves around the implementation of a project of which the con-
sequences are uncertain in two respects. Both a spending and a ®nance min-
ister who have con¯icting interests can appoint one research sta¨, which is
specialised in assessing one type of the policy consequences. For instance, the
research sta¨ either investigates the environmental or budgetary consequences
of the decision, but not both. Ultimately, the median voter in parliament
decides whether or not the project is worth implementing. The preferences of
the median voter lie between the preferences of the spending and ®nance
minister.
Using game theoretical arguments we have shown that in principle, a
minister wants to appoint advisors whose preferences are aligned to the min-
ister's own predisposition towards the project. However, each minister realises
that his research sta¨ needs to persuade the median voter in parliament and
possibly the research sta¨ of the other minister. This provides an incentive
to appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to the preferences of
the agents that have to be persuaded, in order to enhance credibility of the
messenger.
Furthermore, we have shown that depending on the parameters of the
model in equilibrium either polarised or consensual policy advice appears.
Polarised advice refers to a situation where the ministers select advisors whose
preferences di¨er. In contrast, consensual policy advice appears if the minis-
ters choose research sta¨s that have the same predisposition to the project.
The model developed in this paper stresses the importance of persuasion.
This feature of our model may be relevant in other areas of decision making.
For instance managers of ®rms may have to convince the board of directors or
shareholders about the necessity of undertaking an investment project instead
of paying out dividends that were promised previously. Alternatively, ®rms
may have to convince trade unions about the desirability of reorganisations in
order to avoid disruption to production due to strikes. Persuasion to obtain
support for certain decisions is common practice.
The model presented in this paper employs various rather special assump-
tions. Hence several extensions of the analysis are worth investigating. First,
we have assumed that advisors do not require payments. In our model the
advisors are purely policy motivated. We conjecture that our results remain
valid as long as payments are not contingent on the realisation of the sto-
456 W. Letterie et al.chastic variables and as long as the bene®ts of advice to the ministers exceed
the costs. Secondly, we did not study a repeated version of the game. This
would introduce reputational and career considerations for both advisors and
ministers. Thirdly, we have assumed a very simple setting in which ministers
can only appoint one specialised advisor. If a minister were able to select two
advisors with di¨erent preference parameters, the minister may obtain more
information even if they are both restricted to say ``yes'' (i.e. Y) or ``no'' (i.e.
N) and have information on the same stochastic variable. The message space
would then be Y;Y, Y;N, N;N and N;Y. Finally, we assumed that
knowledge of an advisor and messages were not veri®able. For instance, we
assumed that the median voter was not allowed to appoint an advisor. Pre-
sumably, these extensions will qualify our results.
Appendix A
Proof. bS A max1
2 f ÿ t;2f ÿ t;min1
2t  f;2t  f










f ÿ t A2
b
S > 2f ÿ t A3
Using Eq. (14) de®ne VbS:
VbS2b2
S ÿ 22t  2s  fbS  2st ÿ f
2  2tf  5sf
Since s < t, if b
S < 1
2s  f, then (A1) is satis®ed. This requires V1
2s  f











Eq. (A2) requires V1













23st  f3st > 0
Eq. (A3) requires V2f ÿ t > 0. Rearranging the corresponding expression
gives
V2f ÿ t3f ÿ t
2  2ts ÿ ft2 ÿ sf > 0
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Proof Proposition 1. An important feature of our model is that the advisor
who is appointed by the ®nance minister must be able to communicate infor-
mation to the median voter. In fact equation (6) re¯ects this notion and indi-
cates that communication between the advisor of the ®nance minister and the
median voter occurs if the inequality EpVjmF  NFU0 is satis®ed. Hence,





bF  t  bSU0 B1
First note that if bS  bF  b
c this condition holds. Second, the spending
minister may either choose bS  b
S or bS  b
c. However, in principle the
®nance minister wants to choose a research sta¨ with bF  f, if the informa-
tion this advisor provides convinces the median voter. From (18) and (B1) it
follows that S cannot choose bS  b
c if b
c U f, because if F chooses bF  f in
response, this advisor BF convinces the median voter. As a consequence
bS  b
S and bF  f are selected by the ministers if b
c U f. Furthermore,
according to equation (B1), bS  b




S. Then the spending and ®nance minister choose bS  bF  b
c.




S the spending minister may either choose bS  b
S or bS  b
c and
both options are feasible. Obviously, since the spending minister moves ®rst in
our game, he chooses bS to maximise expected utility. In that case the spend-
ing minister may select an outcome that yields him highest utility. We ®rst
de®ne Wb
S and Wb
c. The expressions for Wb
S and Wb
c correspond
to the spending minister's utility derived under the polarisation and consensus
outcome, respectively.
Wb
S 2t  2b



























Hence, S chooses bS  b
S if Wb
S > Wb
c otherwise he chooses bS  b
c.
Suppose now that b
c  f. Then Wb
S  fWb
c  f. Obviously, if b
S is




c. Suppose now that b
c  1
2b
S  f. This implies
b
S  2b
c ÿ f. Using (B1) yields
Wb
S  2b




















c ÿ ff  9b
c ÿ f
2 > 0 B5








c  22t  b
cs ÿ b
c > 0, Wb





S  f > Wb
S there exists a C A f; 1
2b
S  f such that
Wb
c  CWb
S. We argued before that for b
c < f, bS  b
S and bF  f




bS  bF  b
c are selected in equilibrium. It follows immediately from the
above discussion that for b
c < C, bS  b
S and bF  f are chosen. Otherwise,
bS  bF  b
c are selected.
Proof Proposition 2. Note that C is implicitly determined by the equality








 4t2  2tf  2b
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Collecting terms, using that qWb
S=qb

















Note that 4t2  4Ct  C
2 2t  C
2. Since s > C and 2t  C > 0, we
obtain qC=qs > 0.
Appendix C
Proof Proposition 4. We have to prove that b
S > f and b
S < s < t, which
requires that Vf > 0 and that Vs < 0, respectively, where Vÿ is as
de®ned in Appendix A. Straightforward algebra reveals that
. Vf s ÿ ff  2t > 0. . Vsÿ  s ÿ f2s  2t ÿ f < 0.
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Proof Proposition 5. The term b
S is implicitly determined by Eq. (14). Di¨er-
entiating (14) with respect to f;s and t yields:
4b





S  2f ÿ 2t ÿ 5s D1
4b





S ÿ 2t ÿ 5f D2
4b





S ÿ 2s ÿ 2f D3
respectively. The second order condition implies that 4b
S ÿ 4t ÿ 4s ÿ 2f < 0.
Therefore, we have to show that b








. Since t ÿ f  2 1
2s > t ÿ s  2 1
2s  t  1 1
2s > t, and b
S < s < t (see Appen-
dix C), we have b
S < t ÿ f  2 1
2s. . We have to show V1
2t  11
4 f < 0. It can be shown in a straightforward
manner that V1
2t  1 1
4 fÿ 1 1
2t  1
2 f




EpVjmF  YF > 0 requires n  2
3t ÿ 1
3bS  bF > 0. This must be checked
for both the polarisation and consensus outcome.
. If bS  bF  b
c  1 1
2n ÿ 1





3t > 0 . If bS  b
S and bf  f then n  2
3t ÿ 1
3b






S > 0 since b
S < 1
2t  f < 2t  f as shown in Appendix
A.
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